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SHAREHOLDER ATTACK AGAINST STOCK OPTIONS FOR
CORPORATE EXECUTIVES*
A PUBLICLY held corporation may reward its executives by granting them
options to purchase stock.1 In the ten years prior to 1950, grants of stock options
were relatively rare.2 In the face of revenue laws that generally taxed option
profits in the same manner as ordinary income,3 executives apparently preferred
cash payments or other forms of compensation rather than possibly speculative
option gains and equity in the corporation. 4 But recent additions to the In-
ternal Revenue Code and Salary Stabilization Board Regulations have cata-
pulted the stock option into prominence. Section 130A of the Code 1 permits
executives to postpone the tax on profits from "restricted" stock options 0
*Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, rehearing denied, 91 A.2d 62
(Del. Sup. Ct. 1952) ; Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660, limited rehear-
ing granted, 91 A.2d 57 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952), adherence on rehearing, 21 U.S.L. WREzx 2230
(Del. Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 1952).
1. Executives stand to profit to the extent that the market price of the company's
shares rises above the option price. Baker, Stock Options for Executives, 19 HARv. Bus.
REv. 106, 115 (1940) (data on large executive profits under stock option plans from 1935-
1939). Stock options are used primarily by publicly held corporations, since options are
valuable only where stock is traded.
2. FETTER & JOHNSON, COMPENSATION AND INCENTIVES FOR INDUSTRIAL EXEccuTivsv
/ 95 (1952) (only 2 of 50 companies studied had stock options between 1945 and 1949).
From 1928 to 1938 about 25-35% of listed corporations adopted stock option planq.
Baker, supra note 1, at 107, 121. While companies in financial straits often used options
during this period to employ high-priced executives without large cash outlay, many
prosperous companies also gave options as "a token of appreciation." Id. at 109-110.
3. Prior to 1946, option profits were taxed at regular income rates when "intended"
as a substitute for salary, while profits from options "intended" solely to give employees
a proprietary interest in the company were taxed at capital gains rates. From 1946 to
1950, the Commissioner attempted, with limited success, to tax all option profits at regular
rates. For a full survey of tax aspects, see WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD, COMPENSATING
THE CORPORATE ExECUTIVE 129-148 (2d ed. 1951) (hereinafter cited as WASHINGTON &
ROTHSCHILD); Alexander, Employee Stock Options and the 1950 Revenue Act, 6 TAX
L. REv. 165 (1951) ; Lyon, Employee Stock Option under the Internal Revenue Code
of 1950, 51 COL. L. REV. 1, 4-17 (1951).
4. The relative tax advantages of stock options and other forms of deferred com-
pensation are discussed in BUSINESS REPORTS, INC., EXECUTIVE PAY PLANS (1951);
CONFERENCE BOARD MANAGEMENT RECORD, INCREASING EXECUTIVE TAXE-HOMn PAY
(1951) ; Mahon, Corporate Tax Planning to Get Minimum Tax Liability for Executives
and Shareholders, 92 J. ACCOUNTANCY 582 (1951).
5. INT. RE,. CODE § 130A.
6. For an option to qualify as a "restricted" stock option, the option price must be at
least 85% of the market value of the stock at time of grant. Further, the employee's
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until disposal of the stock purchased under the option, and, in some cases,
provides capital gains rather than ordinary income treatment of option
profits. 7 At the same time, the Salary Stabilization Board has exempted
from the salary freeze stock options qualifying for capital gains treatment
under 130A.8 As a result, over 300 corporations have adopted stock option
plans for executives in the past two years.0 The flood of options has been
accompanied by the appearance of stockholder suits attempting to check their
issuance on the theory that they constitute "gifts of corporate assets."1 0
option must be non-transferable and exercised during employment or three months there-
after. Stock acquired must not be sold by the optionee until two years after the option
is granted and six months after the option is exercised. Avd the optione must hold
less than ten percent of the voting power of the granting corporation. Ii.T. REv. Comn § 130
A(d). For discussion see sources cited note 3 supra.
7. If the option price is between 35% and 95% of market price at the time of the
option grant, the executive is taxed at regular income rates when the stock acquired
under the option is disposed of, but then only on the spread between option price and
market price at time of grant. If, however, the option price is at least 95%o of market
value at time of grant, there is no tax on the spread; and the executive pays only
capital gains rates on the difference between the value of the stock when the option was
exercised and its value when the executive disposes of it. lirr. REV. Cons § 13OA(b).
For accounting mechanics, see Accounting Rescarch Bulletin No. 37, Accourting for Cow.-
pensation in the Form of Stock Options, 87 J. AccourNCY 3-41 (1949).
For criticism of § 130A as "handouts... to a special few taxpayers" (corporate execu-
tives), see Griswold, The Blessings of Taxation: Recent Trends in the .Law of Federal
Taxation, 36 A.B.A.J. 999, 1057 (1950) ; Lyon, supra note 3, at 1, 53. But see Sm.,. REP. No.
2375, 81st Cong., 2nd Sess. 59 (1950).
S. SSB General Salary Stabilization Regulation No. 4 (rev.), 17 FED. R . 3M4
(1952). Stock option plans were included in the salary freeze during World War IL
WSASHINGTON & RoTmscHin.D 296-322 (history of salary stabilization policies from 1942-
1951). For rationale of present Salary Stabilization Board policy, see RE'orr oF" SPZC1AL
PAmL To SALARY STABnZATioN BOARD, STOCK OPTIONS AND STOCK PUraCMsE PL.A's
(Oct. 23, 1951).
9. Wall Street Journal, August 6, 1952, p. 1, col. 5. See also McKiNsmv & Co., So=:
OpTnoNs As AN INcEN'nvn F0R ExEcuTmvms (1952) (1 out of 6 companies on the New
York Stock Exchange have stock option plans). Securing of tax benefits for executives
seems to be the principal stimulus for many post-1950 option plans. See, e.g., advice to
corporations by management consultants in Patton, Who Should Get Stoch Options?
30 PEnsoar.-EL J. 417, 424 (1952) ; McKnsEy & Co., op. cit. supra, at 2. Many proxy
statements, while indicating options were granted pursuant to § 130A, give no other reason
for the grant of the plan. NICB, ExEcumv SToCX OwNERsmran PL.Azs 35, 39, 54, 55, 70
(1951). Despite widespread use of stock options to effectuate tax savings for executives,
it is not clear that such savings do stimulate managerial efficiency. See FLrr & Jon:;-
sox, op. cit. supra note 2, at 37-49 (high surtax rates have probably not drained managerial
efficiency).
10. E.g., minority shareholder suits are now pending against the option plans of U.S.
Steel, Standard Oil of New Jersey, Commercial Investment Trust, American Airlines
and other corporations. Communication to the YALE LAw JouruAL from .Mdessrs. Fulton,
Walter, and Halley, dated September 17, 1952, in Yale Law Library.
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In two recent cases before the Delaware Supreme Court, Kerbs v. California
Eastern Airways, Inc." and Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corporation,12
individual stockholders sued to enjoin the operation of option plans. Boards
of directors of the defendant corporations had voted stock options to them-
selves and to other executives. Eastern Airways claimed that it sought to
retain key men through increases in compensation,' 3 while the alleged pur-
pose of the Heyden Chemical Corporation option plan was to stimulate
executives' incentive by providing them with a proprietary interest in the
corporation.' 4 The option plans were submitted to stockholders for approval
and a majority of the stockholders ratified. Shortly after ratification of
the Eastern Airways options the market price of Eastern Airways stock
doubled.' 5
In both cases the court pointed out that the primary issue before it was
the existence of "consideration" sufficient to support the grant of the option
to the executive.16 Eastern Airways' option program, designed to retain key
men, was held to lack necessary consideration, since the plan permitted options
to be exercised immediately or within a short time after termination of em-
ployment and, consequently, did not adequately insure that executives would
remain with the company 11 Judgment for plaintiff was rendered. In the
Heyden Chemical case, the court held deficient as a matter of law a plan
whose sole objective was to encourage stock ownership. I8 The court denied
11. 90 A.2d 652 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952), reversing 83 A.2d 473 (Del. Ch, 1951).
12. 90 A.2d 660, limited rehearing granted, 91 A.2d 57 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952), adhcrence
on rehearing, 21 U.S.L. W=< 2230 (Del. Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 1952), reversing 83 A,2d 595
(Del. Ch. 1951).
13. Brief for Appellee, pp. 31-3, Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d
652 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952).
14. Brief for Appellee, p. 7, Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1952).
15. The facts of the two cases are set out in Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways,
Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 654-5 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952), and Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.,
90 A.2d 660, 661-3 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952).
16. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 664 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952); Kerbs
v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952).
17. Id. at 656-7. The court, on grounds that the tax law is "insecure," rejected
appellee's argument that inducement to qualify for § 130A benefits would keep executives
with the coporation. Ibid. The court's position is ostensibly sound since there is strong
organized pressure to repeal § 130A. See, e.g., C.I.O. PAMPHLET No. 190, FoR A FAMr
TAx POLICY (1951). And it is possible, though questionable, that changes can apply retro-
actively where parties have relied on the prior law. Compare Milliken v. United States,
283 U.S. 15 (1931) (retroactive application valid where taxpayer knew at time of reliance
that tax changes were contemplated by Congress), with Nichols v. Coolidge, 274 U.S.
531 (1927) (retroactive application invalid where reliance on prior law).
18. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 664 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952). The
Heyden Chemical Corporation plan may have been called "proprietary" to escape the
need for Salary Stabilization Board approval, since, under Board Regulation 4, options
to increase incentive and encourage stock ownership can be granted without Board
[Vol. 62
NOTES
motion for summary judgment, however, and remanded the case to the trial
court with instructions to take further evidence on the plan's objective 19
and to consider whether the value of the options was reasonably geared to
the services the plan insured.-" On petition for rehearing, the court also noted
that a presumption of validity would attach to the directors' actions in all
situations except where directors vote themselves options without stock-
holder ratification.
21
The "consideration" doctrine as typically stated by the Delaware court 2
affords little chance for shareholder ,ictories in future suits. To conform to
the Eastern Ait'ways holding, requiring assurance that the option plan's
objectives will be realized, corporations need only tie up the services of
executives.2 3 Assurances such as one-year employment contracts, installment
options contingent on continued employment, and covenants not to compete
approval, while plans intended to constitute compensation require approval. With the
Delaware court's requirement that option plans contain provisos to retain executives, the
Board may consider these plans "compensatory'." Consequently, corporations, to avoid
criminal prosecution, would do well to secure Board approval of plans with retention
provisos. Alternatively, the corporation may choose to bring its stock option plan within
other exceptions to salary freeze regulations by (1) insuring that executives do not
dispose of "option stock" within periods specified in Regulation 4; or (2) granting
options as "increased compensation" for merit and length of service, "new and changed
position," promotion, or permissible groups. For collected regulations and discussion see
P-H Corp. SEv. 7 20,979 (1952) ; WsrmcNroxz & ROTHSCHIlD 315-19.
19. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A2d 660, 664 (Del. Sup. Ct. 195.2).
20. Id. at 665, modified, 91 A.2d 57, 59 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952).
21. Id. at 58. For discussion of the presumption, see 3 FLxrcnIM, CY'cZo I o.'
CoRPoRATiox LAw § 921 (11th ed. 1947) ; 1 SH NGTon & RorHscHuu. 256; B3A. =rnM
oN.z CopPonaso.Ns § 70 (2d ed. 1946).
The court granted petition for rehearing on the single issue of whether a Delaware
statute, making directors' judgment conclusive about the value of consideration for stocl,
applies to stock option plans, Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 91 A2d 57, () (Del. Sup.
Ct. 1952), and decided that the statute did not apply. Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp.,
21 U.S.L. Wnax 2230 (Del. Sup. Ct. Nov. 14, 1952). For problems raised in applying this
type of statute to stock options, see Comment, 47 MCH. L. REv. 1179, 1185 (1949).
22. The Delaware "consideration" requirement is generally followed elsewhere. See,
e.g., McQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F2d 877, 834 (4th Cir. 1940); Holt-
husen v. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125 (E.D. Pa. 1943). But New York courts dispense
with the consideration requirement when the option price of shares is above the marlket
price in the period between the grant of the option and the commencement of the suit.
Abrams v. Allen, 36 N.Y.S.2d 170 (Sup. Ct. 1942), aff'd mm., 246 App. Div. S35, 42
N.Y.S.2d 641 (1st Dep't 1943). This rule, based on the belief that such options are
valueless, overlooks the value that "stems from the optionee's assurance of participation,
share for share, in any increase in the market value of any security, without investment
in it and without the risk of loss." Comment, 49 COL L. Rz. 23-2, 235 (1949).
23. Wall Street Journal, August 6, 1952, p. 1, col 5; P-H Corporation News,
September 22, 1952, p. 1. See also communication to Y.-L Lxvw' Jour.,. from Arthur
G. Logan, counsel for shareholder in the Eastern Airways case, dated Sept. 2, 1952, in
Yale Law Library, indicating defendant's plans to amend option grant. For indications
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have long been considered sufficient.24 And since courts are willing to infer
from the existence of a legal obligation to remain with a corporation that
an option plan seeks to retain executives, the Heyden Chemical requirement
of a legitimate objective for the plan becomes academic. 25 Finally, insistence
that the value of options be reasonably related to the executive services to be
rendered is generally a meaningless pronouncement. Courts state that they are
unable to gauge the worth of executive services.20 And if suit is brought
to enjoin the option plan prior to its operation, the value of the unexercised
option is also speculative 27 In the past, the court's inability to evaluate in
such situations has almost always resulted in judgment for the corporation
through recourse to the "proper business judgment rule," which establishes
a presumption in favor of the validity of the plan.28 On the other hand, after
of the large number of post-1950 plans that will probably be invalid unless amended to
conform to the Eastern; Airways holding, see NICB, ExEcUTIVE STocxc OWNERSui,
PLANS, Table 16, Append. A and B (1951). For legal problems in amending a running
employment contract, see WASHINGTON & ROTHSCHILD 269.
24. See, e.g., Holthusen v. Budd Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 488, 489 (E.D. Pa. 1943)
(1-year employment contract with stock option); Sandier v. Schenley Industries, Inc.,
79 A.2d 606, 609 (Del. Ch. 1951) (installment option); WAsHiNGToN & RoTlscuuL 33,
182, 205-06 (pension plans with covenant against competition). And see Kaufman v. Shoen-
berg, 21 U.S.L. WEEK 2194 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1952).
Court insistence on tying up executive services does insure realization of the goal of
retaining the executives. However, where an option plan seeks to increase incentive, mere
tying up of services is no guarantee of increased executive effort. Consequently, where in-
centive plans are involved, courts should insist on making the exercise of the option con-
tingent on rising profits or dividends. But see Kaufman v. Shoenberg, 21 U.S.L. WE I. 2194
(Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1952). Several post-1950 plans satisfy this requirement. See NICB,
ExEcuTIvE STOCK OWNERSHIP PLANS 17 (1951).
25. See, e.g., Holthusen v. Budd Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 488, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1943).
The legitimate objective requirement also becomes academic when courts do not look
behind the stated purpose of option plans, for the stated objective may often fail to reflect
the actual purpose of the grant. See, e.g., Clamitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 687,
693 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. denied, 331 U.S. 825 (1947). See also SANDERS, THE ErmrC
OF TAXATION ON ExEcurIvES 129 (1951); Lyon, Employee Stock Options under the
Internal Revenue Code of 1950, 51 COL. L. REV. 1, 10 (1951). However, it is clear that
reward for past services does not constitute a legitimate objective for option plans. Holt-
husen v. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125, 129 (E.D. Pa. 1943). But reward for past services
may be sufficient consideration for pensions and bonuses. WASHINGTON & RoTHscuHu
275-8. For exception to the "past services" rule, see BALLANTINE ON CORPORATIONS § 75
(2d ed. 1946).
26. See, e.g., Heller v. Boylan, 29 N.Y.S.2d 653, 669 (Sup. Ct. 1941), aff'd inel.,
263 App. Div. 815, 32 N.Y.S.2d 131 (1st Dep't 1941) ; Baker, A "Just Gauge" for Exeit-
tive Compensation, 22 HA~v. Bus. REv. 75 (1943). See also Washington, The Corporation
Executive's Living Wage, 54 HARv. L. REV. 733, 769 (1941).
27. For discussion, see Wyles v. Campbell, 77 F. Supp. 343, 350 (D. Del. 1948).
28. See, e.g., Clamitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 687, 693 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 825 (1947); Diamond v. Davis, 38 N.Y.S.2d 103, 115-116 (Sup. Ct.
1942), af'd inein., 292 N.Y. 554, 54 N.E.2d 683 (1944). And see cases and discussion In
WASINGTON & RoTHscHILD 383-412.
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the option has been exercised, suits brought against executives to recover
option profits do have the value of the option ascertained. But since executives
have remained with the corporation in reliance on the option grant, courts
again uphold the options except in the most blatant cases of abuse.29
Legal doctrines other than "lack of consideration" also provide little op-
portunity to check the issuance of options. Pre-emptive rights tenets are of
meager assistance since they do not give shareholders priority to subscribe
to the treasury shares or original issue utilized in almost all option plans.='
And even where other shares are used, state statutory provisions may render
pre-emptive rights nugatory.31 Stockholders may also attempt to prove "over-
reaching" by directors in the grant of an option.32 But, although stockholders
have raised the issue in cases where there was apparently a flagrant breach
of fiduciary duty, the theory has never invalidated an option plan.:m And
some courts are even willing to hold that a conceded breach of duty is "cor-
rected" once stockholder ratification has taken place.34
29. For full discussion, see Comment, 49 COL. L RM. 232, 236 (1949). Moreover,
plaintiffs who bring suits against directors to recover option profits aftu.r options have
been exercised may run afoul of prohibitive bonds required by several states in stock-
holder "derivative" actions. For collection of statutes requiring bonds, see BAu .x;Tz.
ox CoaoRA-noxs § 157a (2d ed. 1946). On the other hand, suits brought against the c.,r-
poration to enjoin commencement of option plans are apparently considered "individual"
and not "derivative." Id. at 336.
30. Id. at § 209. Only about seven percent of post-1950 option plans use new issue shares
which may be subjected to pre-emptive rights. NICB, ExEcUTnvE SrocX Ow.,'c.snir PLA:s
11 (1951) (data on source of stock for 86 option plans).
31. Holthusen v. Budd Mfg. Co., 52 F. Supp. 125, 127, same, 53 F. Supp. 4S3, 491
(E.D. Pa. 1943) (statute permitting elimination of pre-emptive rights in stod: purchase
plans); Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., N.J. Super. Ct., Nov. 12, 1952 (same) ; Gottlieb v.
Heyden Chemical Corp., 90 A.2d 660, 666-7 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952) (amendment of corporate
charter eliminates pre-emptive rights) ; VVAsHING'o-o & ROTHSCHILD 126-9 (collection and
discussion of stock purchase statutes). Application of pre-emptive rights to stock option
plans is discussed in Comment, 49 CoL L. Rmv. 232, 240 (1949); Comment, 47 Micur. L
REv. 1179, 1185 (1949).
32. See, e.g., Clamitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 6,7, 623 (2d Cir. 1947) ; Halt-
husen v. Budd Mffg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 423, 490 (E.D. Pa. 1943). In addition to the com-
mon law action for "overreaching," Section 16(b) of the Federal Securities Act of 1934
requires officers who dispose of stock in their company within six months after its ac-
quisition to return their profits to the company at the instance of a private suit. 43 STAT.
896 (1934), 15 U.S.C. § 78p(b) (1946). See Hardee, Stock Options and Me Insidcr
Trading Provisions of the Securities Act of 1934, 65 HA v. L REv. 997 (1952). But
since executives must hold stock for six months to qualify for § 130A tax benefts, the
Federal Securities Act will rarely be called into play.
33. See, e.g., MIcQuillen v. National Cash Register Co., 112 F2d 877, 133 (4th Cir.
1940); Holthusen v. Budd Mfg. Co., 53 F. Supp. 43 (E.D. Pa. 1943). For criticism
of the McQuillen decision, see BALLANT NE ONi COR.o%.TIO1;S 194-5 (2d ed. 1946).
34. See, e.g., Continental Securities Co. v. Belmont, 206 N.Y. 7, 17-18, 99 N.E. 133,
142 (1912). For collection of cases see VAsHnxGToNq & ROrHSCHILD 252-5.
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In the absence of legal protection, stock-option grants are excellent vehicles
for invasion of stockholder interests through gifts of corporate assets and
voting rights. Since there is little arm's length dealing between directors and
executives, and none where directors vote their own pay, the interplay of
market forces cannot insure that compensation is reasonably geared to the
value of services.3X Presumably, stockholders exercise a check against "in-
sider abuse" through the practice of ratification."0 But because the corpora-
tion has marked advantages in proxy fights, ratification is often an empty
formality.3 7 While these conditions inhere generally in granting executive
compensation, they are present in greater degree where stock options are
used. Proxy statements, ostensibly designed to inform stockholders for pur-
poses of intelligent judgment of option proposals, do little more than urge
adoption of plans.38 Statments do not usually reveal the hidden diminution
of corporate earnings resulting from loss of a "compensation" tax deduction
when a Section 130A option is granted.30 Nor do they present any attempt
to set forth the basis for the valuation of executive services. 40 At the same
time, since the potential value of the option is hitched to future corporate
prosperity, proxy statements do not assert-and stockholders cannot know
-how much the executive will actually receive.41 In this situation, insiders
may take full advantage of their special knowledge of corporate affairs to
provide seemingly plausible rewards that later ripen into excesses. 42
To protect shareholders, courts should refuse to apply the "business judg-
ment" presumption of validity in favor of stock-option plans. Generally, use
35. DIMOCK AND HYDE, BuREAucRACY AND TRUSTEESHIP IN LARGE CoRPoRATIOxNs
23-5, 124 (TNEC Monograph 11, 1940); Bates, The Board of Directors, 19 HARV. Bus.
REv. 72, 78-9 (1940).
36. "In our view . . . the entire atmosphere is freshened and a new set of rules in-
voked where formal approval has been given by a majority of independent, fully informed
stockholders." Gottlieb v. Heyden Chemical Corp., 91 A.2d 57, 59 (Del. Sup. Ct. 1952).
In fact, where stockholders' ratification is unanimous, courts will immunize plans from
judicial review. See Kerbs v. California Eastern Airways, Inc., 90 A.2d 652, 656 (Del.
Sup. Ct. 1952) ; Eliasberg v. Standard Oil Co., N.J. Super. Ct., Nov. 12, 1952.
37. Stockholders may not learn of plans in time to contest them effectively; in-
cumbents have easier access to stockholder lists; management can draw on the corporate
treasury for proxy fight expenses; management often rides in on shareholder inertia,
For full discussion, see Note, 61 YALE L.J. 229 (1952) and sources therein cited.
38. NICB, ExEcuTIvE STocK OwNERsHiP PLANS 34-72 (1951); Baker, Stock
Options for Executives, 19 HARv. Bus. REv. 106, 116 (1940).
39. NICB, op. cit. supra note 38, at 37-72 (1951) (of 25 post-1950 proxy statements
examined, only four mention loss of corporate deduction).
40. Ibid.
41. Ibid.
42. For discussion of abuse of insider knowledge, see Overfield v. Pennroad Corp,
42 F. Supp. 586, 612 (E.D. Pa. 1942), rev'd, 146 F2d 889, 924 (3d Cir. 1942); Horn-
stein, Legal Controls for Intracorporate Abuse-Present and Future, 41 COL. L. Rav. 405,
416 (1941). Apparently this danger troubled even the proponents of § 130A. H.R. Ram,
No. 2087, 80th Cong., 2nd Sess. 5-6 (1948).
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of the presumption rests on a desire to avoid judicial interference in corporate
business decisions. 43 However, an exception to the rule has long been recog-
nized when a subtantial possibility of abuse of shareholder rights exists, as
where transactions are not at arm's length. Thus, for example, the presump-
tion is not applied where insiders vote themselves compensation without ob-
taining stockholder approval.44 But the rationale of the exception applies
equally when directors vote executive compensation, for there is again little
arm's length dealing.4 5 And since ratifications function primarily as rubber
stamps, 40 their occurrence can hardly correct abuses sufficiently to warrant
bringing the presumption into play. Abolition of the presumption will make
stockholder suits a more realistic proceeding.47 It will force corporate ad-
ministrators to produce facts, peculiarly within their knowledge, of the actual
objective of the option plan and the basis for their evaluation of the option
and executive services. Moreover, courts will be obliged, as they are when
directors vote themselves compensation without ratification, to employ their
own judgment rather than hand the case to defendants whenever the court
is in doubt.4S
43. See, e.g., Clamitz v. Thatcher Mfg. Co., 158 F.2d 687, 693 (2d Cir. 1947), cert.
denied, 331 U.S. 825 (1947); BALLA TE ON CORPORATIONS § 63a (2d ed. 1946) and
sources therein cited.
44. See, e.g., Schemmel v. Hill, 91 Ind. App. 373, 385, 169 N.E. 678, 63 (1930);
3 FwrcHER, CYCLOPEDIA OF CoRpoRAnioN LAw § 921 (rev. ed. 1947).
45. See note 35 sfqra.
46. See note 37 supra.
47. For discussion of the utility of private actions to prevent and police corporate
abuse, see Brindle v. Smith, 46 F. Supp. 522, 529 (S.D.N.Y. 1942); Comment, 34 CoL
L. Riv. 1308, 1321 (1934).
48. Shortly before this issue went to press, decisions were handed down in Kaufman
v. Shoenberg, 21 U.S.L. AVEar 2194 (Del. Ch. Oct. 21, 1952), and Eliasberg v. Standard
Oil Co., N.J. Super. Ct., Nov. 12, 1952, the first cases applying the Eastenm Airwjys and
Heyde;i Chemical holdings. In both cases boards of directors voted stock options to a
majority of their members and to certain key employees, and subsequently secured stod=-
holder ratification. In Kaufnan the court admitted that the options were neither necessary
nwr intended to retain the scr'ices of the recipients. Nevertheless, it held tv-o-year employ-
ment contracts sufficient consideration for the options. And although ratification was secured
without disclosing either the identity of specific recipients of the options or the fact that
these recipients already benefited from a profit-sharing plan, the court refused to use its
own judgment in weighing the plan's reasonableness. In Standard Oil the court approved
an "incentive option" although it indicated that there was no danger of losing the executives
and that they were already putting forth their best efforts. Read together, Kaufman and
Standard Oil thus make meaningless the doctrinal requirements of legitimate objectives
and adequate safeguards for option plans. Additionally, Standard Oil provides two signifi-
cant lessons for future litigants. Judged by the New Jersey court's reaction to the facts of
the case, a corporation does well in securing SEC "approval" of its proxy statement; and
complaining shareholders decidedly should attempt to demonstrate (a) that many other
shareholders were misled by the proxy statement, and (b) that these shareholders would
have voted against the option plan if certain undisclosed facts had been revealed.
19521
